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Abstract
Allowing for a richer information structure than usual, we show that rational traders’ calculation
with short-term price fluctuations may heavily influence their behaviour even if the interim price is
not influenced by non-rational agents i.e. there is no noise trader risk. Instead, traders expect that
new rational entrants with diﬀerent information in the interim period will drive the price against
them. Consequently, rational traders in the first period will hesitate to trade on their private
information or - in the extreme - will trade against their private information i.e. buy more of the
risky asset when they consider it worse. In the first part we develop a microstructure model with
learning where the above eﬀect will result in severe ineﬃciency and mispricing. In the second part,
we discuss the critical properties of the information structure which are expected to result in similar
findings in general models.
JEL classification: D4, D8, G11, G12.
1 Introduction
Thanks to the dotcom bubble in the second half of the 90s, we have a vast amount of anecdotal
evidence that even if a large group of professional investors are aware of the mispricing of certain
assets, they do not necessarily trade on this information. Often cited examples where new-technology
stocks were obviously not in line with their fundamental value include Priceline.com, whose market
capitalization reached $30 million, or America Online which was worth roughly $636 billion in April
1999, but there are similar figures on eBay, Yahoo, GeoCities or Lycos. All of them had a market
value, which dwarfed those of established traditional industry stocks, which — unlike the majority
of new-technology firms — actually made profits. However, this phenomenon is not exclusive for the
dotcom bubble. For example, it is worth to have a look on Shleifer’s (2000) discussion on Frankel and
Froot (1988) survey evidence on similar finding of the US dollar market in the eighties.
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mange, Ashraf Jaﬀer, Zsuzsa Elek and seminar participants at the LSE and at the DELTA-Paris-Jourdan. All remaining
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“Frankel and Froot evaluate the forecasts and recommendations of a number of exchange
rate forecasting services during the period in the mid 1980s when the dollar had been rising
for some time without widening in the U.S - rest of world interest rate diﬀerentials and
with a rising U.S. trade deficit. Frankel and Froot find that during this period the typical
forecaster expected the dollar to continue to appreciate over the next month but also to
depreciate within a year in accordance with underlying fundamentals. Consistent with
these expectations, forecasting services were issuing buy recommendations while maintain-
ing that the dollar was overpriced relative to its fundamental value. Such trend-chasing
short run expectations, combined with a belief in a long run return to fundamentals are
hard to reconcile with a fully rational model" (Shleifer 2000, pp. 155)
We have chosen Shleifer’s interpretation instead of the original paper, because it also reflects the
general approach of behavioural finance literature on similar empirical facts (see Shleifer, 2000 or
Barberis and Thaler, 2003 for surveys). They argue that it is either the irrationality of the informed
trader — overconfidence (e.g. Sheinkman and Xiong, 2002), loss aversion (e.g. Barberis and Santos,
2003) etc. — or the systematic irrational bias of traders’ sentiment they are trading with — like noise
traders in De Long et al (1990), Shleifer and Vishny (1996) or Brunnermeier and Abreu (2003) — which
can be behind prices not being in line with the fundamental information present in the market.
In this paper, we show that both the seemingly irrational expectations of Froot and Frankel’s
forecasters and the fact that professional traders may trade against their private information can be
explained by a model where all informed traders process information rationally and where there are
no noise traders with systematic bias in their sentiment. Our critical assumptions will be that new —
informed — entrants are expected to participate in the market and we allow for a richer information
structure than usual. In our model traders may trade against their information or ignore it completely
because of short-term fluctuations caused by the new rational entrants i.e. there is a rational trader
risk. The main properties of the information structure which drives our findings are that there is
a public signal present on the value of the asset and the private information of first period traders
and new entrants is weakly correlated. In the following section, we will show in a classroom example
that this type of structure results in the surprising fact that the guess of a trader at the value of the
asset and her guess at another trader’s guess in the following period move in the opposite direction as
her private information changes. In particular, as her private information shows a lower fundamental
value, her guess at the guess of the other trader will increase. Hence, the worse the asset looks for the
trader, the more she will pay for it, if she expects to resell it in the following period. This property
will drive our results.
The problem of our traders is similar to the one in ”limits to arbitrage” models of the behavioural
finance literature. Just like there, the problem of our traders is that they have to deal with the fact
that in the interim period the price may be driven away from the fundamental value. For example, in
the seminal paper of DeLong et al (1990) and Schleifer and Vishny (1996) fad following noise traders
are the cause of the divergence. In Scheinkman and Xiong (2002) overconfident traders, who process
their information wrongly, cause the mispricing. In Brunnermeier and Abreu (2002,2003) the price
is diﬀerent from the fundamental value by assumption and the problem of the traders is that it can
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be driven back only if enough of them act the same time. As we mentioned, the crucial diﬀerence
in our story is that early traders are afraid of rational latecomers driving the price away from this
early traders’ guess at the fundamental value. Furthermore, latecomers would do this for the perfectly
rational reason that they have diﬀerent information so their guess at the fundamental value is diﬀerent.
Probably, Allen et al (2003) is the most related work to our own. They show that the presence of a
public signal and short horizons together break down the law of iterated expectations in an asymmetric
information set up i.e. traders expectations on the fundamental value and their expectations of others’
expectation will be diﬀerent. In particular, they show that early traders will overweigh the public
signal and underweight the private one. With our richer information structure this break down is
more spectacular, as in our set up not only the weights but also the sign of weights will diﬀer.
There is also a string of literature (Harrison and Kreps, 1978, Allen et al ,1992, Morris ,1995, Biais
and Bossaerts, 2000) on rational speculation where the fundamental valuation and the speculative
value related to the expectation of others’ expectations is diﬀerent. But unlike our work, those papers
rely on heterogeneous priors and their assumptions result in abstract models, which are hard to link
to standard asset-pricing frameworks.
Our paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we present a classroom example which
makes the intuition behind our model very clear in a very simple set up. In Section 3, we present
a modified version of Kyle’s (1989) share-auction model, which will show that our intuition works in
a standard microstructure framework with learning. We also discuss the eﬀect of our story on the
eﬃciency of the market and the interim mispricing of the risky asset. In Section 4, we analyse the
critical assumptions in our model with special attention on the properties of the information structure.
Finally, we state our conclusions.
2 Wallet game with a public signal
Inspired by Klemperer’s (1998) wallet game, in this section we present a classroom example which
illustrates the intuition behind our model. The game is as follows. Two students — a boy and a girl —
are asked to participate. They do not know each other — probably they are from diﬀerent classes —,
but the teacher knows both of them. Each student has a wallet in his or her pocket with some money
in it. The teacher announces first her own guess at the sum of the money in the two wallets. Then
she asks the students to write two numbers on a sheet of paper. They both have to guess the sum
and what the other will guess as the sum. So the girl has to guess what the boy will guess as the
sum and the other way around. The better their guesses, the greater the payoﬀ they receive from the
teacher. Let us consider the reasoning of one of them with the supposition that the teacher announced
50 pounds.
When the female student has to guess the sum, she will think in the following way: ”As the teacher
knows both of us, her guess cannot be very far from the truth. Apart from that, if I have little money
today with me, I should guess less, and if I have a lot, I should guess more. So my guess will be
positively related to both the teacher’s announcement and the money in my pocket.”
When she has to guess his guess at the sum, she will think in this way: ”He will use the same
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reasoning about the sum, as I have used. So his guess will be positively related to both the teacher’s
announcement and the money in his pocket. So what is my guess about the amount of his money?
As the teacher knows both of us, her guess cannot be far from the true sum. But if I have 20, and the
sum is 50 then the other student has some money around 30. But if I have 30 he has to have 20 to
make the sum right. Hence, the more money I have, the less my guess at his money will be. But as a
clear consequence, the more money I have, the less my guess at his guess will be, as his guess and his
money is positively related.”
We see that the presence of the public signal causes opposite movements in her two guesses as the
amount of money she has changes. If she has a lot, she will think that the sum is big, but he has
less of it, consequently, his guess will be less. Of course, the optimal guesses of the students depend
on the precise nature of these signals, the correlations between them and their distributions. We
will be very explicit on this issue in section 4. At this point, it is only important to see that if the
relationship between the information of the two students is weak enough — as in our example, where
we assumed that they do not know each other — then the announcement of some noisy aggregate of
the two induces a conditional negative relationship between her private information and her guess at
his guess i.e. the second order expectation of the sum. However, her guess at the aggregate — her first
order expectation of the sum — still remains positively related to her information. Our next question
is what this observation leads to in a financial model.
2.1 Wallet game in financial markets
We will use the intuition behind our simple example in a financial setting. We will use a two-period
model. We will think of the two wallets as two factors determining the fundamental value of a firm.
Hence, the sum of money in the two pockets will be the fundamental value of a risky asset connected
to the value of this firm. We will think of the students as traders of this asset. However, instead
of two students we will have two groups of traders and none of them will observe the value of the
factors perfectly. Instead, each trader in the first group will observe a noisy private signal on the first
factor, while each trader in the second group will observe a noisy private signal on the second factor.1
Apart from their information, investors in the two groups also diﬀer in the time of their entry. The
first group will enter earlier, we may think of them as professional investors getting information — or
allowed to trade — before others. The second group will enter in the second period only; they are
the new entrants. There will be a public signal observed by every participant in the market at the
moment of the entry: the announcement of the teacher.
As the fundamental value of the asset will be realized at the end of the second period, new entrants
will care about the fundamental value only. Hence, their demand will positively depend on their private
information; just like in the classroom example. Consequently, — if new entrants’ demand dominates
aggregate demand in the second period — the second period price will be positively related to the
fundamental expectation of the second group: their guess on the sum. Our focus will be on the
1With independently and normally distributed factors and error terms, this is the simplest structure which makes the
intuition of our classroom example work. However, in section 4 we will show that much less restriction on the information
structure is suﬃcient.
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demand function of the first group in the first period. In the spirit of our example, their fundamental
expectation — their guess on the sum — will be positively related to their private signal, but their
expectation of the interim price — their guess on the guess of the second group on the sum — will be
negatively related to their private signal.
The critical question is how these two opposite eﬀects enter first-period demand functions. A
rational trader’s first-period demand in a two-period model consists of two main parts. Firstly, she
will try to use her information to earn profits on the price change between the two periods. Secondly,
she will hedge her second period demand. Let us take the example of the competitive equilibrium of a
CARA-normal model with long-term traders, where first period traders’ wealth is given as the sum of
the profits in the two periods. By backward induction, after substituting in the optimal second-period
demand, these two parts enter linearly into the first-period demand function in the following way (see
Brunnermeier 2001, pp. 110):
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where p1, p2 are the prices, θ is the fundamental value, Iit is the information set of trader i in period t,
A and B are positive constants determined by terms in the variance-covariance matrix of the random
variables θ, p2, E
¡
p2|Ii2
¢
and the risk-aversion parameter. The first term reflects the short-term profit
motive, while the second term reflects the hedging motive. If the intuition in our class-room example
works, the hedging part will depend positively and the short-term profit part will depend negatively
on the private signal. Hence, depending on the relative size of A and B , first period-traders may buy
more or less of the asset as their private information improves or — if the two eﬀects cancel out — they
may ignore their private information all together.2
Alternatively, we may reinterpret the nature of the relative forces of our two opposing eﬀects, if
we transform (1) as follows:
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Now, the short-term profit part in the first pair of brackets is contrasted to the long-term profit on
the asset in the second pair of brackets. Apart from the risk-aversion of agents embodied in A and
B when there are no ineﬃciencies in the market, in reality, there can be many factors which aﬀect
the weights of short-term and long-term motives. Probably, the most obvious one is that consumers
smooth their consumption, so price fluctuation will matter. Another simple argument is that they may
be impatient having a high subjective discount rate. They can also be long-term investors who are
subject to liquidity shocks in the short-term. It is also possible that they are maximizing short-term
gains but they are uncertain whether the fundamental value will be realized in the short run, or not.
Uncertain execution time can also cause similar eﬀects. Alternatively — as in Shleifer and Vishny
2Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2002) present numerical simulations arguing that generally, the hedging part is small
for relevant parameter values, hence the bulk of the results in models with short-lived traders would generalize to models
with long-lived traders. To the extent that this is true, it means that readers interested in results reflecting the pure
long-term case without any other ineﬃciencies, should focus their attention — in our model presented in the next section
— to the results when µ is close to 1.
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(1997) — they can be agents getting continuation funds from investors in the second period, only if
their first period performance is good enough. Or they are paid by their short-term performance, but
their future employment possibilities depend on their reputation of being able to pick the stocks with
high fundamental value. Even trustees who profess long-term investment goals to their fund managers
will, in turn, suﬀer from similar agency problems vis-à-vis their principals, the beneficiaries of the
pension fund.
From an intuitive point of view, the logic of our model will go through with any of these stories
including the standard long-term investor case. In all cases the positive relationship between the pri-
vate information and the fundamental valuation is oﬀset partly or wholly by the negative relationship
between the private information and the expected interim price resulting in mispricing and informa-
tional ineﬃciency. However, diﬀerent stories would result in models with diﬀerent tractability. Hence,
we choose to work with two simplifying assumptions. Firstly, we do not build up the relative size of
the two opposite eﬀects — the constants A and B — from the primitives of the model, but we take it
as exogenously given and analyse the eﬀect of its change. Secondly, we assume that our first-period
traders trade strategically only once, in the first period. The resulting model will allow us to analyse
the equilibrium consequences of these forces taking into account the eﬀect of imperfect competition,
signalling and learning, for the expense of not being able to address how primitives aﬀect the relative
sizes of the short-term eﬀect and the hedging eﬀect in the demand function. However, in Proposition
7, we will show that — in any linear model — even if we have long-term traders trading in each period,
if there are enough new entrants with private information not too correlated with the private informa-
tion of first period traders, E
¡
p2|Ii1
¢
and E
¡
θ|I i1
¢
will move to the opposite direction as early traders’
information changes, hence our results are expected to hold in a much more general context.
Our assumptions correspond to the delegation story. For example, our first period traders may
be portfolio managers whose problem is to make a trading decision when new entrants are expected
to arrive in the interim period causing price fluctuations. Even if managers have some information
on the fundamental value of the asset, their payoﬀ may be linked to the short-term profit as well, as
investors may judge their abilities by their interim performance. As timing the market perfectly is
impossible, they make a once-and-for-all portfolio decision taking into account the trade-oﬀ between
long term and short-term gains.3
In the next sections we formalize our intuition.
3 The model
We modify Kyle’s (1989) share-auction model in order to show that the intuition of our wallet game
with public signal example goes through in a fully-fledged microstructure model, which incorporates
rational learning. Kyle (1989) uses a static set-up where a finite number of informed agents and a finite
3A spectacular real-life example of the severity of fund managers’ problem to go for short-term gains even if the
asset is overpriced is — borrowed from Brunnermeier and Abreu (2003) — that two legendary hedge fund managers Julian
Robertson of Tiger Hedge Fund and Stanley Druckenmiller of Quantum Fund lost their jobs due to this trade-oﬀ. The
earlier because he decided not to invest in new-technology stock, so his Fund could not keep up with the profit of others,
and the latter because he decided to ride the bubble, but he did not exit before it burst.
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number of uninformed agents submit demand curves to buy up a random supply of a risky asset. He
shows that there is a unique symmetric linear Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game, where traders
submit linear demand curves, which are increasing in their signals and decreasing in the price. Within
the periods, our set up will be virtually the same as that model, with the only exception that we drop
the uninformed agents, as they would only complicate our analysis without any added value. However
the structure of the supergame, the payoﬀs and the information structure will be diﬀerent.
The focus of our attention will be the portfolio choice of n1 informed fund managers (early traders),
who enter the market in the first period and bid for the u1 random supply of the risky asset. They
know that the true value, θ, will be realized at the end of the second period only. Based on their
information, they suspect that the interim price, p2, probably will not be in line with their fundamental
valuation. They trade only in the first period, and they are faced with the problem of whether to
ride on this mispricing for short-term gains, or to take a position against it, risking interim loss. We
assume that their payoﬀ reflects this trade-oﬀ in the following way:
EUi = E(e
−ρWi)
Wi = µd
i
1(p2 − p1) + (1− µ) di1(θ − p1) = di1 (µp2 + θ (1− µ)− p1) = di1 (s− p1)
where s is the weighted average of the true value and the interim price and µ is the measure of the
trade oﬀ. We look at Wi as purely monetary, where the first part is received by the manager when p2
is realized as the remuneration for the short-term gains/losses and the second part is received when θ
is realized as the bonus — or penalty — for the ability to guess the true value. The constant µ reflects
the relative weight of these two aspects in the remuneration package of the manager. Note, that µ = 0
is the long-term investor case — who can trade only once — and when the µ = 1 the investor is myopic.
Just as in Kyle, they submit demand curves and the market clears at p1.
Now, until this point the insight of the model looks similar to many limits to arbitrage models like
Shleifer and Visny (1997) or DeLong et al (1990). There are traders with an interest in the interim
price. The main novelty of this paper is that the price in the second period is not driven by irrational
traders i.e. there is no noise trader risk. The second period price, p2 is formed in a similarly rational
way as the first one. There are n2 informed traders (new entrants) that enter and bid for the u2
aggregate random supply of the asset. The true value is realized at the end of the second period. The
second period traders maximize a CARA utility function over their profit W j2 = d
j
2 (θ − p2) with the
same risk-aversion coeﬃcient ρ as the first period traders. They are not faced with trade-oﬀ. Just as
in the first period, traders in the second period submit demand curves and p2 is the market-clearing
price.
The driving force of the model is the information structure. We follow the strategy that in this
section we use the simplest signal structure which is consistent with our story and we delay the
discussion of a general class of signal structures which is expected to result in similar eﬀects until the
next section. Hence, here we assume that the true value, θ, is determined as the sum of two independent
factors, θ1 and θ2. We think of them as projects of the firm — which produce the cash flows that the
risky asset is a claim of — which are generating signals in diﬀerent time periods, probably because
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they are not started at the same time or they generate profit in diﬀerent horizons. Consequently, each
trader in the first period observes a private signal on the first factor, and each trader in the second
period observes a private signal on the second factor. Additionally, there is a public signal, y, on θ
observed by all players when they enter. We think of the public signal as a firm or industry specific
earning forecast, a credit rating or other indicator which gives information on the aggregate value of
the firm’s projects announced by the firm itself or other agencies. We assume that all noisy terms,
the random supply and factors are iid normal. Formally:
θ = θ1 + θ2, y = θ + η,
xi = θ1 + εi, x
0
j = θ2 + εj
θ1, θ2˜N(0,
1
γ
), u1˜N(0,
1
δ1
), u2˜N(0,
1
δ2
)
η˜N(0,
1
β
), εi˜N(0,
1
α
)
Although we will argue in the next section that our story is robust to a large class of signal structures,
it is important to stress that even this specific example may catch an important insight of the nature
of information in financial markets. Our argument is that public signals, like quarterly reports, credit
rating updates and forecasts are tend to come in regular intervals tend to contain information on the
whole company. In contrast, private signals are just generated from time to time when there is a
leakage of information and they are frequently about parts of the value of the company: some new
projects, business plans etc. Hence, the situation that some public information is announced at the
beginning of the period and then insiders with information on some factors have to calculate with
the possibility of new entrants with information on other factors can naturally arise in many markets.
Furthermore, economists think of the value of a firm as the sum of value of the activities of the firm;
a view which is consistent with our formulation of θ.
We will search for Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibria of the game i.e. we want to find , d1 (xi, y, p1)
and d2
³
x0j , y, p2, p1
´
demand schedules of first period traders and second period traders respectively,
satisfying
E(e−ρ(d
j
2(x0i,y,p1)(θ−p2))) ≥ E(e−ρ(d
j0
2 (x0i,y,p1)(θ−p2))) ∇j,∇dj02 (2)
E(e−ρ(d
i
1(xi,y,p1)(s−p1))) ≥ E(e−ρ(di01 (xi,y,p1)(s−p1))) ∇i,∇di02 (3)
n1X
i=1
di1 (xi, y, p1) = u1 (4)
n2X
j=1
d
j
2
¡
x0j , y, p1
¢
= u2 (5)
and second period beliefs are updated by Bayes Rule4. Just as Kyle (1989), we will restrict our
4Kyle (1989) discusses in length the necessary technical conditions on the demand functions and the market-clearing
rules to have a well defined equilibrium concept. The demand function restrictions will not be relevant here as we focus
our attention to linear demand functions. Regarding the market clearing conditions, Kyle specifies arbitrary rules on
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attention to symmetric equilibria where the demand functions are linear in the signals and in the
price. To find the equilibria we use the method of undetermined coeﬃcients. The details of the
derivation are in appendix A, here we just give an intuition of the main steps. Firstly, we assume that
demand functions have the following form:
d1i = b1xi + c1y − e1p1 (6)
d1j = b2x
0
j + c2y + f2p1 − e2p2 (7)
where b1, c1, e1, b2, c2, f2, and e2 are — not necessarily positive — coeﬃcients. Secondly, using the
market clearing conditions (4) and (5), we determine the equilibrium price for the given coeﬃcients.
It is shown in Kyle (1989) that given the CARA-Normal framework and the oligopolistic structure of
the market the equilibrium demand functions will have the form of
d1i =
E(s|p1, xi, y)− p1
ρvar(s|p1, xi, y) + λ1 (8)
d2j =
E(θ|p2, x0j , y, p1)− p2
ρvar(θ|p2, x0j , y, p1) + λ2
(9)
where λ1 = 1(n1−1)e1 and λ2 =
1
(n2−1)e2 are the slope of the residual supply curve in the first and in the
second period respectively5. Furthermore, the second order conditions for the first and second periods
are
ρvar(s|p1, xi, y) + 2λ1 > 0 (10)
ρvar(θ|p2, x0j , y, p1) + 2λ2 > 0. (11)
Thirdly, we derive the conditional expectation and conditional variance of the random variables θ
and s needed for (8) and (9) given the coeﬃcients. Note, that the properties of normally distributed
random variables secures that expectation terms are linear and variance terms are constants in signals
and the price. Hence, in the final step, we can equate the coeﬃcients of p1, xi and y in (8) and (6)
and those of p2, x0j , y and p1 in (9) and (7). As the outcome of these steps, equilibrium is given by two
second-order conditions and seven equations — one for each coeﬃcient — all of them are given in the
appendix.
Although we do not have a general proof of the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium, we
can show it in certain important subcases. We present them in the following two propositions.
the choice of equilibrium price of the auctioneer when more than one price clears the market and when the aggregate
demand would be infinite for any price. We refer the interested reader to the original paper noting that none of these
cases will happen in equilibrium in our model.
5Note, that the first period demand — apart from the λ term of the imperfect competition structure — corresponds to
the first-period demand function (1) of a long-term, twice-trading speculator in the standard model with the substitution
of µ satisfying µ
(1−µ) =
(A−B)
B . Hence, we arrived to the same form of first period demand functions by exogenously
assuming the trade-oﬀ between short-term and long term gains, instead of deriving them from the primitives. In this
sense, our analysis incorporates the standard, long-term CARA-Normal case (see also Proposition 7).
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Proposition 1 The game has a unique linear symmetric Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the
following subcases.
1. When µ = 0 or
2. when δ1 → 0.
Proof. Proof is in the appendix.
Proposition 2 For each combination of the parameters other than µ, there is a unique µ = µ∗ which
corresponds to an equilibrium with b1 = 0. This µ∗ is in the interior of the unit interval.
Proof. Proof is in the appendix.
When µ = 0, first period traders care about the fundamental value only, so from their perspective
they are in a Kyle(1989)-type one period model with the only diﬀerence being of the presence of the
public signal. So it is not surprising that we have the same result of existence and uniqueness as in
the original model. The case of δ1 → 0, is much more interesting. It shows that when the supply
shock in the first period is very large — when we eﬀectively assume away learning from first period
prices —, then we can prove existence and uniqueness. From the point of our story, the existence result
in proposition 2 is of crucial importance. It shows that even if there is learning, there will always
be an equilibrium where the trade-oﬀ between short-term fluctuations and fundamental value is such
that first period traders ignore their private information completely (b1 = 0). It means that even if
their private information tells them that the price is too high or too low compared to the fundamental
value, they will not trade on this information fearing that price fluctuations in the short run will
cause too much short-term losses. The main point is that this fear comes from the understanding
of the interaction between the information structure and new entrants’ rational trading decisions in
the second period. Early traders know that first period prices will not transmit enough information
to second period traders to make them drive the price to the fundamental value. Just the opposite:
rational traders in the second period drive away the price from first period traders’ estimate of the
true value. This is the rational trader risk.
In the next proposition we describe the behaviour of the coeﬃcients in any equilibrium.
Proposition 3 In any linear equilibrium of the game b2 and e2 are positive. Regarding the signs of
the rest of the coeﬃcients, there are the following subcases.
1. When γe2(γe2+βb2) > µ — the small µ case —, f2, b1, c1, e1 are also positive.
2. When γe2(γe2+βb2) = µ — the µ = µ
∗ case —, f2 = 0, b1 = 0 and c1, e1, c2 are positive.
3. When γe2(γe2+βb2) < µ — the large µ case —, b1 < 0, and depending on the parameters either
(a) f2 < 0 and e1, c1, c2 > 0 or
(b) f2 > 0 and e1 < 0.
Furthermore, as δ1 → 0 — first period price becomes uninformative — the system converges
to 3.a in the large µ case.
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Proof. Proof is in the appendix.
These results are very intuitive. Second period traders are interested in the true value only, so
they behave as it is usual in traditional models, the higher their private signal and the lower the price,
the more they buy of the asset (b2, e2 > 0). However, in the first period the situation is diﬀerent.
Let us consider first the two polar cases: when µ = 0 first period traders are interested in the true
value only. Just as in the second period and as in our wallet game, when they have to guess the true
value, the higher their private information, the more they buy of the asset (b1 > 0). In the other
polar case, when µ = 1, they interested in the interim price only. They behave as our students in
the wallet game when they had to guess the guess of the other player. They do so, because second
period prices are very much related to the guess of second period traders, so if first period traders
want to receive short-term gains, they have to guess what latecomers will guess. Furthermore, this
second order expectation will be negatively related to the private signal of the trader by the same
logic as in the wallet game (b1 < 0). They observe the public signal on the aggregate value, so the
higher the factor which they have private information on, the lower the other factor has to be to keep
the aggregate value in line with the public signal. And the higher the other factor, the higher the
guess of traders in the second period will be. Between the two polar cases, the two opposite eﬀects
are weighted diﬀerently, and the sign of b1 changes accordingly. Hence, there must be a particular µ∗
where the two forces exactly cancel out (b1 = 0). The signs of c1 and c2 are not of much interest,
when we know something about them, then their signs are positive. What is more surprising is the
behaviour of f2 and e1 when b1 is negative. Case 3.a. is simpler to understand. Here, f2 is negative, so
second period traders demand less if they learn that the equilibrium price in the previous period was
high. In standard models it cannot happen, as there higher prices mean higher private signals, which
in turn mean higher fundamental value. But here, first period prices work as inverse signals. As b1 is
negative, the information content of first period prices will be just the opposite of the standard case.
If first period price is high, it means high demand, which must be the result of low private signals.
Therefore, a rational trader in the second period will infer that the asset is bad and demand less of
it. In this case, positive e1 shows that demand functions are negatively sloped as usual. However, in
case 3.b, e1 will be negative i.e. the higher the current price, the more first period traders want to
buy. In this model, the only possible reason, if the positive information content in the current price
outweighs the negative eﬀect that actually they have to pay more for the asset. It can happen when
first period price is a strong positive signal for second period traders i.e. when f2 is high and positive.
Hence, in these high-µ equilibria first period traders expect that higher current price will increase
second period prices enough to make it rewarding to pay more for them. But for this f2 has to be
positive even if b1 is negative which seems to be in contradiction with our argument on negative f2 in
the 3.a case. It is not, because these are equilibria with positively sloped demand curves in the first
period (e1 < 0): the auctioneer works in the opposite way as usual. If at the actual price demand was
too high, she would increase the price. Hence, high first period price means low first period demand
which means high first period signals. So first period price is a positive signal of the true value. This
is equilibrium logic: f2 can be positive, because e2 is negative, and e2 can be negative, because f2 is
very high and positive. Given that it is a signalling argument, it is intuitive that when the supply
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shock is too noisy — so learning is impossible — we cannot have an equilibrium of the 3.b type. We end
up in 3.a. To sum up, when the weight on short-term fluctuations, µ, is high enough, traders trade
against their fundamental information because they expect the second period price to move in the
opposite direction. In this case, first period prices might become inverse signals of the true value, or
first period demand functions may be positively sloped because the expected signalling eﬀect makes it
worth to buy more of an asset with a higher price. We illustrate these analytical results with numerical
computer simulations shown in Figures 1-3 (3.a case for large µ) and in Figures 4-6 (3.b case for large
µ).
Now, we turn our attention towards the eﬀect of these informational problems to market eﬃciency
and pricing. We measure informational eﬃciency of the prices by the additional percentage decrease
in the conditional variance of the fundamental value due to the observation of the price. Our findings
are presented in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 The information content of p1, defined by 1 − var(θ|y,p1)var(θ|y) , the reduction in the condi-
tional variance as a result of observing first period price, is positively related to absolute value of b1,
and it reaches its minimum value zero at µ∗. The information content of p2, defined by 1− var(θ|y,p1,p2)var(θ|y,p1)
the additional reduction in the conditional covariance as a result of observing the second period price,
is positively related to the absolute value of b1 and to the absolute value of b2.
Proof. Proof is in the appendix.
Our result shows that we can expect a u-shaped pattern in the eﬃciency as µ increases. We know
that at µ = 0 b1 is positive, there is a µ∗ where b1 = 0, and then at µ = 1 b1 is negative. Hence,
the information content of the first period price is positive when µ is small enough and when it is
large enough. However, at µ∗ it is zero, which makes sense as this is the point where demand does not
depend on private information, consequently the price will not aggregate any of the private information
in the market. As second period prices depend on b1, we expect similarly u-shaped patterns, but the
outcome is ambiguous as the measure depends on b2 as well. The second price measure will be always
positive. At µ∗, even though it does not contain any private information from the first period, it still
incorporates private information from the second period as b2 is always positive. Figures 7 illustrates
our results6.
We also asses how first period price over- or underweight diﬀerent elements of information which
are present at the market. Our benchmark is the ”perfectly aggregating market”, where price is
just the expected fundamental value conditional on all public and private information in the joint
information set of participants. From the market clearing condition (4) and the linear demand curves
(6), it is apparent that the expected price in the first period will be a linear function of the public
signal and the average private signal. Namely, the coeﬃcient of y will be c1
e1
and the coeﬃcient of
the average private signal will be b1
e1
. Hence, we can compare these coeﬃcients with the coeﬃcients
of the ”perfectly aggregating” linear regression of E(θ|y, 1
n1
P
xi). When the diﬀerence is positive we
6For results considering the information content of prices and the over- and underreaction of signals, we present figures
corresponding to a parameter combination which results in equilibria of the 3.a type for large µ values. Figures for the
case when there are also equilibria of the 3.b type would be very similar.
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will conclude that the public or the private piece of information is overweighed. A given piece of
information can be over- or underweighted for four separate reasons:
1. Average expectations eﬀect. Even if individual demand curves would reflect the best individual
estimates of the fundamental value, the average of the individual guesses reflected in the price
will not equal the guess using the average private signal. This is related to the fact that the
average private signal is more precise than individual signals. This problem is highlighted in
Allen et al (2003).
2. Imperfect competition eﬀect. The price may be influenced by bid-shading of traders, who are
aware that their trades aﬀect prices.
3. Signalling eﬀect. Traders with short-term motives will try to influence the price, when second
period traders learn from it.
4. Rational trader risk eﬀect. Because of our information structure, traders expect that second
period prices will move against them. This aﬀects their trades, which influences first period
price formation.
The fourth eﬀect is the most important from the perspective of this paper. In order to separate
out these eﬀects, we will first calculate the same measure for the case when the supply is so noisy that
the first period price becomes uninformative i.e. δ1 → 0, which excludes the signalling eﬀect. We also
work out the measure for the hypothetical case when — in addition to the uninformative first period
price — traders do not expect that their trades will aﬀect prices, so — instead of (8) — they form their
demand by
d
1pc
i =
E(s|p1, xi, y)− p1
ρvar(s|p1, xi, y) ,
where the subscript pc refers to perfect competition. This assumes away the imperfect competition
eﬀect. The following Proposition summarizes the analytical results.
Proposition 5 Our coeﬃcient by coeﬃcient measure of mispricing, showing the diﬀerence between
the coeﬃcients of the optimal linear regression of the market information on the true value and the
actual coeﬃcients given by
E(p1|y, 1
n1
X
xi)−E(θ|y, 1
n1
X
xi),
shows that in the first period, in cases 2 and 3.a of Proposition 3 and when µ = 0 the auctioneer
underreacts 1
n1
P
xi . The eﬀect of y in the first period is ambiguous.
When p1 is uninformative — δ1 → 0 — then in both under the perfect and imperfect competition
assumptions, the auctioneer underreacts the average private signal when µ = 0 and the underreaction
worsens in a linear rate as µ increases. The public signal is overreacted when µ = 0, it changes linearly
as µ increases, but the direction is ambiguous.
Proof. Proof is in the appendix.
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In Figure 8 we illustrate the separation of diﬀerent forces aﬀecting the under- and over reaction of
signals. The first observation to make is that the imperfect competition and the perfect competition
cases are practically indistinguishable, hence the imperfect competition eﬀect is — although not zero
— very small. It happens, because the coeﬃcients b1, c1, e1 are aﬀected very similarly by bid shading,
so in the fractions b1
es
and c1
e1
most of the eﬀect cancels out. All curves related to the same signal
start from the same point. It is so, because at µ = 0 neither the signalling eﬀect nor the rational
trader risk eﬀect are in operation, as traders do not have short-term motivations at this point. Hence,
at the µ = 0 point, curves diﬀer from 0 only because of the average expectation eﬀect. Consistent
with Allen et al (2003), the average expectation eﬀect is positive in the case of the public signal
and negative in the case of the private one. As µ increases, the role of the signalling eﬀect and the
rational trader risk eﬀect increases. As it is apparent from the δ1 → 0 case, the rational trader
risk eﬀect worsens the overreaction of the public signal and the eﬀect looks considerably larger than
the average expectation eﬀect. This is not surprising as with larger µ, traders react more to their
guess of the interim price, which can be very diﬀerent from their guess on the fundamental value.
Numerical simulations with diﬀerent parameter values seems to indicate that the overreaction of the
public signal also always worsens due to the rational trader risk eﬀect, but it is not proved analytically.
The diﬀerences between the straight lines and the corresponding non-linear curves in Figure 8 show
the hectic eﬀect of signalling. In the case of the private signal it remains negative for all µ, but it is
not monotone anymore. In the case of the public signal, the aggregate eﬀect becomes ambiguous.
4 Discussion
In the previous section we showed that even if interim prices are determined by fully rational traders
who optimally update their information observing past prices, short-term traders may ignore their
private information or trade against it. It must be clear now that these results are simple consequences
of the fact that our first period trader’s expectation on the fundamental value and their expectation
on the second period price move in the opposite direction as their private information changes. In this
section we will discuss the critical properties of the information structure and the role of new entrants
in this phenomenon. As the normality assumption has a preponderant role in asset pricing models
with asymmetric information, we restrict ourselves here to the normal case. However, in a companion
paper, Kondor (2004), we show that our results can be derived from a particular modification of the
aﬃliation concept and it can be applied to many problems outside of finance.
4.1 The information structure and the role of new entrants
In financial models with asymmetric information — just as in our model — there are factors which
determine the common value of the asset and there are signals on these factors which determine the
information sets of agents. Typically (see Brunnermeier, 2001 for a detailed survey), the structure
used is with a normally distributed factor, private signals which are noisy versions of this factor with
iid normally distributed noise terms and possibly there is a similar public signal:
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θ = θ1, xi = θ1 + εi, y = θ1 + η (12)
θ1˜N(0,
1
γ
), η˜N(0,
1
β
), εi˜N(0,
1
α
).
The problem with this structure is not that there is only one factor. The problem is that this results
in a very rigid structure: the covariance of any two of the public signal, the private signal and the
fundamental value is the same: 1
γ
, which is also the variance of the fundamental value. Let us consider
instead, a general normally distributed system of the fundamental value and signals:
¡
θ, x, x0, y
¢
∼ N1+n1+n2+1(0,Σ)
where x and x0 are vectors of signals of two groups of traders, θ is the fundamental value and y is the
public signal as before. Just like in our wallet game with a public signal example, we are interested
in structures where the first order guess of a trader is increasing, but the trader’s guess of someone’s
guess in the other group is decreasing in her private signal:
∂E
³
θ|x0j , y
´
∂x0j
> 0 (13)
∂E(E
³
θ|x0j , y
´
|xi, y)
∂xi
< 0. (14)
Condition (13) is quite natural. If it does not hold, we cannot really call xj a ”signal on the fundamental
value”. So we will simply assume it.7 The following proposition shows that in addition to (13), for
(14) we simply need that the correlation between the private signals of traders in diﬀerent group is
not too high.
Proposition 6 Let (θ, x, x0, y) is a jointly normally distributed system of 1 + n1 + n2 + 1 dimension.
Let us assume that
∂E
³
θ|x0j , y
´
∂x0j
> 0.
Then
∂E(E
³
θ|x0j , y
´
|xi, y)
∂xi
< 0
if and only if
ρxix0j
< ρxi,yρx0jy
, (15)
where ρz1z2 is the linear correlation between the variables in the subscript.
7However, it is easy to show that (13) holds if and only if
corr(θ, xj) > corr(θ, y)corr(y, xj).
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Proof. By the projection theorem E
³
θ|x0j , y
´
is linear and normally distributed. Therefore
E(E
³
θ|x0j , y
´
|xi, y) is also linear and
∂E(E
³
θ|x0j , y
´
|xi, y)
∂xi
=
∂E
³
x0j |xi, y
´
∂xi
∂E
³
θ|x0j , y
´
∂x0j
,
which has the same sign as the first term by assumption. Using the projection theorem again
∂E
³
x0j |xi, y
´
∂xi
=
σxi
σx0j
ρxix0j
− ρxi,yρx0jy
1− ρ2
x0jy
,
where σz terms are standard errors. Observing that the first term and the denominator of the second
term are always positive, gives the result.
It is easy to see that the particular information structure we used in our model satisfied (15) for
all parameters as ρxi,x0j was zero. In contrast, in the standard asymmetric information set-up of (12),
(15) simplifies to α
α+γ < α
β
(α+γ)(β+γ) , which obviously never holds. This illustrates well the rigidity of
the standard system.
Condition (15) is very intuitive. It shows that the opposite movement of first and second order
expectations driving our results is expected to arise in any situation where the nature of the information
of the two groups are diﬀerent and there is a public signal which is related to both pieces of information.
Hence, if we are talking about two similar groups with access to the same type of sources, analyzing
data with the same methods, we should not expect our eﬀects to arise. However, when a group of
agents forming expectations of the expectations of another group with diﬀerent characteristics, (15) is
very realistic to hold. Here, we may think of fund-managers versus non-professional investors, technical
analysts versus fundamentalists, investment banks allowed to participating in an IPO or in a Treasury
bill auction versus participants in the secondary market etc.
Until now, we have not say anything about price-formation. It is important for two separate
reasons. Firstly, prices convey information, so traders will learn from them and they will try to use
them as signals for future traders. Therefore, we should know whether the relationship between private
signals and first- and second-order expectations change when prices enter into their information sets.
Secondly, we are interested in second-order expectations only to the extent that they translate directly
to expectations of the aggregate demand in the next period and — consequently — to expectations of
future prices. The answer to the first problem is very model specific. Prices may convey very diﬀerent
type of information in diﬀerent market-structures. For example, if prices are fully revealing, second-
order expectations will be equal to first-order expectations, as the law of iterated expectations will
apply. The second aspect is more intuitive. It is clear that the demand of new entrants should depend
positively on their expectation of the fundamental value, so second-order expectations of early traders
will be closely related to the expected demand of new entrants. The possible problem here is that the
weight of the demand of new entrants in the aggregate demand may not be large enough. For example,
if we have investors in the first group who trade in both periods, future demand will be related to their
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own future demand as well. As a trader’s expectation of her own future expectation equals to her
present expectation by the law of iterated expectations, if both (13) and (14) hold, expected future
aggregate demand will be influenced by two factors: the expectation of the own future demand of the
trader, which is positively dependant on her private signal, and the expectation of the demand of new
entrants, which is negatively dependant on her private signal. Hence, the aggregate eﬀect would be
unclear. Our last proposition gives comforting answers for both questions for models where prices are
linear in signals. It will state that if (15) holds and the proportion of new entrants is large enough, a
first period trader’s expectation of the second period price depends negatively on her private signal,
even if she uses the information embodied in the first period price optimally and even if first period
traders trade in both periods. The proposition also illustrates that if signals satisfy (15), expectations
similar to those of the forecasters interviewed by Frankel and Froot (1989), who expected interim
prices to increase in contrast to the fundamental value, can be perfectly rational.
Proposition 7 Let us consider the system of fundamental value, two groups of private signals, a
public signal and noise terms
¡
θ, x1...xn1 , x
0
1, ..., x
0
n2
, y, u1, u2
¢
∼ N (0,Σ)
where private signals of the same group are distributed symmetrically and u1, u2 are independent of
the private signals. Let first and second period prices be linear functions of signals and noise terms,
where private signals of the same group enter symmetrically:
p2 =
1
n2e
0
2 + n1e2

b2
n1X
i=1
xi + b
0
2
n2X
j=1
x0j + c2y + f2p1 + u2


p1 =
1
n1e1
Ã
b1
n1X
i=1
xi + c1y + u1
!
where bi, ci, ei i = 1, 2 and f2 are undetermined coeﬃcients, and n1 and n2 are the number of traders
in the first and second group respectively. If
ρxix0j
< ρxi,yρx0j ,y
holds, then there exits an n2 that
∂E (p2|xi, y, p1)
∂xi
< 0
for all n2 > n2.
Proof. First, observe that
∂E (p2|xi, y, p1)
∂xi
=
1
n2e
0
2 + n1e2

b2 + (n1 − 1) b2
∂E (xk|xi, y, p1)
∂xi
+ b02n2
∂E
³
x0j |xi, y, p1
´
∂xi


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by the symmetry assumptions. As neither ∂E(xk|xi,y,p1)
∂xi
or
∂E(x0j |xi,y,p1)
∂xi
depend on n2, if n2 is large
enough, the sign of
∂E(x0j |xi,y,p1)
∂xi
will determine the sign of ∂E(p2|xi,y,p1)
∂xi
. So we have to show that if
(15) holds, then
∂E(x0j |xi,y,p1)
∂xi
< 0. Note, that observing p1 together with y and xi is informationaly
equivalent to observing
h =
1
n1 − 1
X
k 6=i
xk +
u1
(n1 − 1)b1
=
1
(n1 − 1)b1
(n1e1p1 − b1xi − n1c1y) .
It is easy to see that σ2h > σ
2
xi . By the projection theorem
∂E
³
x0j |xi, y, p1
´
∂xi
=
∂E
³
x0j |xi, y, h
´
∂xi
=
¡
σ2h − cov (xi, xk)
¢
σ2yσxiσx0j
ρxix0j
− ρyxiρyx0j
D
,
where D is the determinant of the variance-covariance matrix of xi, y, p1, so it must be positive. As
σ2h > σ
2
xi > cov (xi, xk), the proposition holds.
5 Concluding remarks
The view that the market may fail to correct mispricing because informed traders have to calculate
with interim price fluctuations due to fad-following noise traders — i.e. they have to face noise trader
risk — is more and more popular in the finance literature. In this paper we showed that the presence
of noise traders is not a necessary part of this argument. We argued instead that rational trader risk
might result in the same eﬀect. If the information structure is rich enough, there can be situations
where traders informed of the mispricing early are unwilling to trade on their information because they
have to calculate with the actions of rational new entrants in the future with diﬀerent information
and diﬀerent beliefs. We also showed that rational trader risk might cause ineﬃciency and severe
mispricing.
We consider the main strength of our model being that despite of its simplicity, it can replicate
several phenomena which are usually associated with irrational behaviour. Besides the limits to
informed trading and ineﬃciency, it may also result in opposite short-term and long-term expectations
similar to those of the forecasters in Frankel and Froot’s (1988) example, and we showed examples
with positively sloped demand curves in equilibrium which can be interpreted as positive feed-back
trading.
In a related paper, Kondor (2004), we show how our informational requirements can be generalized
for contexts with general distributions and we explore some consequences in non-financial applications.
For further research we are considering to incorporate our information structure in a dynamic general
asset-pricing framework with no parametric assumptions on the utility function or the distribution
of signals. We are convinced that our story will remain robust to any reasonable model as long as
the number of informed traders is finite. We also plan to analyse the normative consequences of our
information structure in a future work. At this point, it is worth to mention the possible implications
to the decision maker’s problem who can decide to reveal a public signal or keep it in secret. It was
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clear already in our wallet-game example, that the presence of public signal is crucial. If the teacher
had not announced her guess in advance, the second-order expectation of the students would not have
been negatively related to their private signal and all of our results would have disappeared. Hence,
in a market where second- and higher-order expectations matter, we expect non-trivial consequences
of public announcements. The eﬃcient mechanism for selling objects in information structures similar
to ours is also an interesting question for the future.
However, probably the most important task is to identify markets and periods where the infor-
mation structure is similar to the one in our set-up and test our model. Following the lines of our
microstructure model, one should concentrate on markets where there is a group of traders with spe-
cific information arriving early to the market with the intention to buy assets for resale. Such possible
applications include IPO-s with a preferred customer group, treasury bill auctions where only partic-
ular financial institution may participate and the 24-hour FX market where traders in diﬀerent time
zones enter the market in diﬀerent time. After all, the question of real-world relevance of rational
trader risk is an empirical question.
Appendix
A.1 Deriving the system of equations determining equilibrium
Let us start with the second period. First we have to specify E(θ|p1, x0j , y) and var−1(θ|p1, x0j , y).
Note, that observing y and p1 is equivalent to observing
g =
e1
b1
p1 −
a1
b1
− c1
b1
y = θ1 +
1
n1
X
εj +
1
b1n1
u1
where we used the market clearing condition
n1b1θ1 + b1
X
εi + n1c1y + u1 = n1e1p1. (16)
The variance of this signal is
var(g) =
1
γ
+
1
n1α
+
1
b21n
2
1δ
=
1
γ
+
1
τg
τg =
b21δ1α1n
2
1¡
α1 + n1δ1b21
¢ .
Similarly, observing p2 together with y, p1 and xi is informationaly equivalent to observing
hi2 = θ2 +
1
n2 − 1
X
k 6=j
εk +
u2
(n2 − 1) b2
=
1
(n2 − 1) b2
¡
n2e2p2 − n2c2y − n2f2p1 − b2x0j
¢
var (hi2) =
1
(n2 − 1)α2
+
1
b22 (n2 − 1)
2
δ2
=
1
γ
+
1
τ2
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where we used the market clearing condition
n2b2θ2 + b2
X
εi + n2c2y + n2f2p1 + u2 = n2e2p2. (17)
By the projection theorem
E(θ|x0j , y, hi2, g) = (18)
=
yβ (2γ + α2 + τ2 + τg) + gτg (γ + α2 + τ2) + α2x
0
j (γ + τg) + τ2h2i (γ + τg)
(2βγ + βα2 + βτ2 + γα2 + γτ2 + βτg + γτg + α2τg + τ2τg + γ2)
=
=


e2
b2
n2τ2(γ+τg)
n2−1 p2 + x
0
j
³
γα2 + α2τg − τ2(γ+τg)n2−1
´
+
+p1
³
e1
b1
τg (γ + α2 + τ2)− 1b2
f2n2τ2(γ+τg)
n2−1
´
+
y
³
β (2γ + α2 + τ2 + τg)− 1b1 c1τg (γ + α2 + τ2)−
1
b2
c2n2
τ2(γ+τg)
n2−1
´


(2βγ + βα2 + βτ2 + γα2 + γτ2 + βτg + γτg + α2τg + τ2τg + γ2)
and
var(θ|x0j , y, hi2, g) =
(2γ + α2 + τ2 + τg)
(2βγ + βα2 + βτ2 + γα2 + γτ2 + βτg + γτg + α2τ g + τ2τg + γ2)
. (19)
After some straightforward, but tedious algebra, substituting (18) and (19) into (8) and equating the
coeﬃcients of b2, e2, f2 with those in (6) result in the following equations
0 = F (b2) = ρb2 (n2 − 1)α2
¡
2γα1 + α1α2 + δ1n1b
2
1 (2γ + α2 + n1α1)
¢
− (20)
− (n2 − 2)α22
¡
γα1 + δ1n1b
2
1 (γ + n1α1)
¢
+
+ρb32 (n2 − 1) δ2 (n2 − 1)
¡
2γα1 + n2α1α2 + δ1n1b
2
1 (2γ + n1α1 + n2α2)
¢
+
+b22δ2α2n2 (n2 − 1)
¡
γα1 + δ1n1b
2
1 (γ + n1α1)
¢
e2 = e2 (b2 (b1) , b1) =
k1b
2
1 + k0
l1b
2
1 + l0
(21)
f2 = f2 (b2 (b1) , b1, e1) =
m1e1b1
l1b
2
1 + l0
(22)
where coeﬃcients k1, k0, l1, l0,m1 are the functions of b2 only, and they are always positive:
k1 = (n2 − 2)
Ã
δ2n1 (n2 − 1) δ1
¡
βα2n2 + γα2n2 + n2n1α1α2 + γ
2 + n1α1β + 2βγ + n1α1γ
¢
b22+
+n1δ1α2
¡
βα2 + γα2 + n1α1α2 + γ
2 + n1α1β + 2βγ + n1α1γ
¢ !
k0 = (n2 − 2) δ2 (n2 − 1)α1
¡
γα2n2 + βα2n2 + 2βγ + γ
2
¢
b22 +
¡
γα2 + γ
2 + 2βγ + βα2
¢
α1α2
l1 =
Ã
ρδ2n1 (n2 − 1)2 δ1 (α2n2 + 2γ + n1α1) b22 + b2n2n1δ1 (n1α1 + γ) (n2 − 1)
2
α2δ2
+ρn1δ1α2 (α2 + 2γ + n1α1) (n2 − 1)
!
l0 = ρδ2 (n2 − 1)2 α1 (α2n2 + 2γ) b22 + γ (n2 − 1)2 α2δ2b2α1n2 + (n2 − 1) ρ (2γ + α2)α1α2
m1 = (n2 − 2) δ1α1n21
¡
δ2 (n2 − 1) (α2n2 + γ) b22 + (γ + α2)α2
¢
.
20
Furthermore, the equation for c2 will be
c2 = (n2 − 2)
³
2βγ + βα2 + βτ2 + βτg − 1b1 c1 (γτg + α2τg + τ2τg)
´
³
(n2 − 1) ρ (2γ + α2 + τ2 + τg) + 1b2n2 (γτ2 + τ2τg)
´ . (23)
where τ2 and τg are functions of b2 defined above, and they are also always positive.
Repeating the same steps for the first period, calculating the conditional expectation of θ and p2
conditional on the information set of a trader i and forming the weighted average, s, results in
E(s|xi, p1, y) = kyy + kp1p1 + kxixi
where
ky =
³
(1−µ)
³
β(2γ+α1+τ1)− n1c1γτ1(n1−1)b1
´
+µ 1e2
³
b2
³
β(α1+τ1+γ)+
τ1β
(n1−1)b1
n1c1
´
+c2(α1β+γα1+τ1β+γτ1+2γβ+γ2)
´´
(2βγ+βα1+βτ1+γα1+γτ1+γ2)
kp1=
³
(1−µ)γτ1 1(n1−1)b1 n1e1+µ
1
e2
³
b2
³
− τ1β
(n1−1)b1
n1e1
´
+f2(α1β+γα1+τ1β+γτ1+2γβ+γ2)
´´
(2βγ+βα1+βτ1+γα1+γτ1+γ2)
kxj =
³
(1−µ)
³
γα1− γτ1(n1−1)
´
+µ 1e2
b2
³
−α1β+ τ1β(n1−1)
´´
(2βγ+βα1+βτ1+γα1+γτ1+γ2)
and the variance is
var (s|y, p1, xi) =
= µ2
b22n2δ2 + α2
e22α2n
2
2δ2
+
(α1 + τ1 + 2γ) (1− µ)2 + 2 b2e2 (α1 + τ1 + γ)µ (1− µ) +
b22
e22
(α1 + τ1 + β + γ)µ
2
(α1β + γα1 + τ1β + γτ1 + 2γβ + γ2)
.
The resulting equations for the coeﬃcients are
0 = G (b1) = (24)
=

 (n1 − 1)
2
³
1− µf2
e2
´
o1b
3
1 + (n1 − 1) o2b21+
+(n1 − 1)2
³
1− µf2
e2
´
o0b1 −
³
(n1 − 2)− µf2e2 (n1 − 1)
´
α1o2
1
δ1
1
n1


e1 = e1
µ
b2
e2
(b1) , b1
¶
=
µ
n1 − 2
n1 − 1
− µf2
e2
¶
v1b
2
1 + v0
o1b
2
1 + o2b1 + o0
= (25)
=
n1−2
n1−1
¡
v1b
2
1 + v0
¢ ¡
k1b
2
1 + k0
¢¡
k1b
2
1 + k0
¢ ¡
o1b
2
1 + o2b1 + o0
¢
+
¡
v1b
2
1 + v0
¢
µm1b1
with
21
o1 = ρδ1 (n1 − 1)

 (1− µ)
2 b22n2δ2+α2
e22α2n
2
2δ2
¡
2βγ + βn1α1 + γn1α1 + γ
2
¢
+
+(2γ + n1α1) (1− µ)2 + 2 b2e2 (γ + n1α1)µ (1− µ) +
b22
e22
(β + γ + n1α1)µ
2


o0 = ρα1

 µ
2 b
2
2n2δ2+α2
e22α2n
2
2δ2
¡
2βγ + α1β + α1γ + γ
2
¢
+ (α1 + 2γ) (1− µ)2+
+2 b2
e2
(α1 + γ)µ (1− µ) + b
2
2
e22
(α1 + β + γ)µ
2


o2 = (n1 − 1)α1δ1n1
(1− µ) γe2 − µb2β
e2
v1 = δ1 (n1 − 1)
¡
n1α1β + n1α1γ + 2βγ + γ
2
¢
v0 =
¡
2βγ + α1β + α1γ + γ
2
¢
α1.
Observe, that o1, o2, o0 are depending on b2e2 only and o1, o0, v1, v0 are positive whenever
b2
e2
is posi-
tive, and the sign of o2 is the same as the sign of (1− µ) γe2 − µb2β. Furthermore,
c1 =
((n1−2)e2−µf2(n1−1))
³
µcβ(2γ+α1+τ1)+µ
1
e2
b2β(α1+τ1+γ)+µ
1
e2
c2(α1β+γα1+τ1β+γτ1+2γβ+γ2)
´
ρ(n1−1)(e2−µf2)

³
(α1 + τ1 + 2γ)µ
2
c + 2
b2(α1+τ1+γ)µµc
e2
+
b22(α1+τ1+β+γ)µ
2
e22
´
+µ2
(b22n2δ2+α2)(2βγ+βα1+βτ1+γα1+γτ1+γ2)
e22α2n
2
2δ2

+ τ1n1(µce2γ−βµb2)
ρ(n1−1)b1e2
. (26)
The slope of the residual supply curves in each period comes from the market clearing conditions
(16) and (17):
λ1 =
1
(n1 − 1) e1
λ2 =
1
(n2 − 1) e2
, which gives the second order conditions
2
1
(n1 − 1) e1
+ ρvar (s|y, p1, x1) > 0 (27)
2
1
(n2 − 1) e2
+ ρvar(θ|xi, y, hi2, g) > 0. (28)
Hence, any set of coeﬃcients which satisfies equations (20)-(26) together with the two second order
conditions (27) and (28) will give equilibria.
A.2 Existence and uniqueness and coeﬃcients in equilibrium
For the proof of proposition 1 and that of proposition 3, we will need the following two lemmas.
Lemma 1 If b1 satisfies (24) and the second order condition (27), then
1. either b1 > 0 and
³
n1−2
n1−1 − µ
f2
e2
´
> 0 and o2, e1 > 0 or
22
2. b1 < 0 and
³
n1−2
n1−1 − µ
f2
e2
´
> 0, o2 < 0 and e1 > 0 or
3. b1 < 0 and
³
n1−2
n1−1 − µ
f2
e2
´
< 0, o2 < 0 and e1 < 0.
Furthermore,
³
n1−2
n1−1 − µ
f2
e2
´
always have the same sign as
³
1− µf2
e2
´
.
Proof. By (25) and (27) the second order condition is
2
¡
o1b
2
1 ± o2b1 + o0
¢
(n1 − 1)
³
n1−2
n1−1 − µ
f2
e2
´ + o1b21 + o0 > 0.
Hence, the second order condition multiplied by (n1 − 1) b1
³
n1−2
n1−1 − µ
f2
e2
´
and 2G (b1) subtracted gives
µ
n1 − 2−
µ
e2
f2 (n1 − 1)
¶µ
2
n1
o2
α1
δ1
− b1 (n1 − 1) o0 − b31 (n1 − 1) o1
¶
which must have the same as the sign of b1
³
n1−2
n1−1 − µ
f2
e2
´
. This results in four possible combinations
of signs of b1,
³
n1−2
n1−1 − µ
f2
e2
´
, o2 and e1: three of them are in the lemma, and there is an additional
one, where b1 > 0,
³
n1−2
n1−1 − µ
f2
e2
´
< 0 and o2 > 0. But the last one is not possible, because if o2 > 0
and b1 ≥ 0 thenµ
n1 − 2
n1 − 1
− µf2
e2
¶
=
n1 − 2
n1 − 1
− µ m1e1b1
k1b
2
1 + k0
=
=
n1 − 1
n1 − 2

1−
¡
v1b
2
1 + v0
¢
(k1b21+k0)
µm1b1
¡
o1b
2
1 + o2b1 + o0
¢
+
¡
v1b
2
1 + v0
¢

 > 0.
Furthermore,
³
n1−2
n1−1 − µ
f2
e2
´
has the same sign as
³
n1−2
n1−1 − µ
f2
e2
´
straightforwardly, in cases 1 and 2 as³
1− µf2
e2
´
>
³
n1−2
n1−1 − µ
f2
e2
´
. We have to show only that in case 3
³
1− µf2
e2
´
> 0 >
³
n1−2
n1−1 − µ
f2
e2
´
is
not possible. But this comes from the observation of equation (24), as there is no negative root of the
equation when
³
1− µf2
e2
´
> 0 >
³
n1−2
n1−1 − µ
f2
e2
´
and o2 < 0.
Lemma 2 For any given b∗1 and any parameter values,(20), (21) and (28) gives a unique b2 and e2
and both of them will be positive and the second order condition of the second period will be satisfied.
Proof. First observe that for any b1,(20) has exactly one positive root and (21) uniquely determines
a positive e2 for any given b1 and positive b2. Simple substitution shows that (20) and (21) can be
written as
0 = F (b2, b
∗
1) =
= (n− 1)
¡
ρ (2γ + τg + nα) δ (n− 1) b32 + n (γ + τ g)αδb22 + 2ρ (α+ 2γ + τg)αb2
¢
−2α2 (γ + τg) (n− 2)
e2 =
¡
2βγ + βα2 + βτ2 + γα2 + γτ2 + βτ g + γτg + α2τg + τ2τg + γ
2
¢
ρ (2γ + α2 + τ2 + τg) +
1
b2
n2
γτ2+τ2τg
n2−1
(n2 − 2)
(n2 − 1)
.
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where τg is depending on b∗1. Hence, (28) is equivalent to
(n− 2) ρ (α+ 2γ + τg + τ2) + 2ρ (α+ 2γ + τg + τ2) +
2 (γ + τg) τ2
(n− 1) b2
n > 0
or — after substituting out τ2 and rearranging — it is also equivalent to¡
2ρα (α+ 2γ + τ g) + 2αδb2 (γ + τg) (n− 1) + ρb22δ (n− 1) (nα+ 2γ + τg)
¢
> 0.
Now, for a b∗2 which satisfies 0 = F (b
∗
2, b
∗
1) and the second order condition, if we multiply the second
order condition with b∗2 and subtract F (b
∗
2, b
∗
1) the result has to be the same sign as b
∗
2. But these steps
result in
2α2 (γ + τg) (n− 2) + b22δα (n− 1) (n− 2) (γ + τg) > 0
which is always positive. Consequently, only a positive b2 can be both the solution of (20) and can
satisfy the second order condition. Additionally, (28) shows that any b2 which gives a positive e2
satisfies the second order condition. Together with the observation that for any b1 there is exactly one
positive root which satisfies (20), these results show that any b∗1 gives a unique b2, e2 which satisfy the
second order condition of the second period and both of them are positive.
Proof of Proposition 1. When µ = 0, (1− µ) γe2−µb2β = γe2, so o2 is positive. Furthermore,
(24) simplifies to
F (b1) = ρ (n1 − 1)2 δ1 (2γ + α1n1) b31 + (n1 − 1)α1b21δ1n1γ + ρ (n1 − 1)α1 (α1 + 2γ) b1 − (n1 − 2)α21γ
which is independent of b2. Simple observation shows that this equation has exactly one positive root,
b+1 . Lemma 1 shows that if o2 > 0, negative roots of F (b1) do not satisfy the second order condition,
hence b+1 is our only remaining candidate for the equilibrium. But if b1, o2 > 0, (25) gives a unique e1
and it will be positive. Hence, b+1 satisfies the second order condition. Regarding the second period, b
+
1
can serve as b∗1 in Lemma 2, so b2, e2 is uniquely given. Then the rest of the coeﬃcients are determined
in a straightforward way.
When δ1 → 0, then f2 → 0 as m1 → 0, and (20) and (21) are independent from b1 in the limit.
Furthermore, (24) and (25) will be
0 = F (b1) =
=
µ
(n1 − 1) o0b1 − (n1 − 2)α21
(1− µ) γe2 − µb2β
e2
¶
e1 = e1
µ
b2
e2
¶
=
n1 − 2
n1 − 1
v0
o0
24
with
o0 = ρα1

 µ
2 b
2
2n2δ2+α2
e22α2n
2
2δ2
¡
2βγ + α1β + α1γ + γ
2
¢
+ (α1 + 2γ) (1− µ)2+
+2 b2
e2
(α1 + γ)µ (1− µ) + b
2
2
e22
(α1 + β + γ)µ
2


v0 =
¡
2βγ + α1β + α1γ + γ
2
¢
α1.
Hence b1 is uniquely determined by
b1 (b2) =
(n1 − 2)α21
(1−µ)γe2−µb2β
e2
(n1 − 1) o0
which has the same sign as (1− µ) γe2 − µb2β, and it determines a positive e1, which means the
second order conditions are satisfied. Finally, c1 and c2 comes from a straightforward substitution of
the values of e2, f2 = 0, b2, b1 into (26) and (23).
Proof of Proposition 2. In Lemma 2, let us choose b∗1 = 0. Then b2 (0) and e2 (0) are pined
down and both of them are positive and the second order condition of the second period is satisfied.
Hence, we can define a µ∗ ∈ (0, 1) by
(1− µ∗)
µ∗
=
b2β
γe2
as the left hand side is monotone decreasing and takes values on the whole positive half of the real
line. This µ∗ leads to o2 = 0, and with o2 = 0, b1 = 0 is a root of (24) for any b2. Furthermore,
f2 = 0 when b1 = 0, so e1 is positive which satisfies the second order condition of the first period..
Substituting this values into (26) and (23), we end up with an equilibrium, where b1 = 0.
Proof of Proposition 3. Lemma 2 shows that in equilibrium, b2 and e2 are always positive.
Lemma 1 shows that when o2 > 0, which is when
γe2
(γe2+βb2)
> µ, b1 > 0 and when
γe2
(γe2+βb2)
< µ then
b1 < 0. In the proof of proposition 2 we showed that when µ =
γe2
(γe2+βb2)
, b1 = 0. The possible sings
of f2, e1, c1 and c2 comes from the simple discussion of the restrictions in Lemma 1 and equations
(26),(23), (25) and (22), so it is omitted.
A.3 Market ineﬃciency and mispricing
Proof of Proposition 4. Our first period measure is
1− var (θ|y, p1)
var (θ|y) = 1−
1
2
(2β + γ) (2γ + τg)
(2βγ + βτg + γτg + γ2)
where τg is the variance of the transformed price signal, g, defined above. Hence,
∂
var(θ|y,g)
var(θ|y)
∂b1
= − (2β + γ) γ
2
(2βγ + βτg + γτg + γ2)
δ1α
2
1n
2
1b1¡
α1 + b21n1δ1
¢2
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which proves the first statement of the proposition. For the second period, observe that observing
p2, y and p1 and xi is informationaly equivalent with observing
g2 = θ2 +
1
n2
X
i
εi +
u2
n2b2
=
1
(n2 − 1) b2
(n2e2p2 − n2c2y − n2f2p1)
var (g2) =
1
γ
+
1
τg2
=
1
γ
+
¡
α2 + n2δ2b
2
2
¢
n22α2δ2b
2
2
and
var (θ|y, p1, p2) = var(θ|y, g2, g) = (2γ + τg + τ2g)
(2βγ + βτg + γτg + γ2 + βτ2g + γτ2g + τgτ2g)
.
substituting it to our second period measure and diﬀerentiation with respect to b1 and b2 gives the
second statement of the theorem.
Proof of Proposition 5. By the projection theorem and our results on the coeﬃcients, it is
simple to show that the coeﬃcient of 1
n1
P
xi in the first period linear equation of mispricing defined
by
E(p1|y, 1
n1
X
xi)−E(θ|y, 1
n1
X
xi)
will be
b1
e1
− γn1α1
(2βγ + βn1α1 + γn1α1 + γ2)
=
=
(µcγe2−µb2β)
(e2−µf2) (α1 + τ1)
¡
2βγ + βn1α1 + γn1α1 + γ
2
¢
− γn1α1
¡
2βγ + βα1 + βτ1 + γα1 + γτ1 + γ
2
¢
((2βγ + βα1 + βτ1 + γα1 + γτ1 + γ2)) (2βγ + βn1α1 + γn1α1 + γ2)
.
We know from Lemma 1 that (µcγe2−µb2β)(e2−µf2) must be negative in the large µ case. Hence, in case 3.a
and in case 2 of Proposition 3, the expression is negative. At µ = 0 also
b1
e1
− γn1α1
(2βγ + βn1α1 + γn1α1 + γ2)
=
=
−γ2 (2β + γ) (n1−1)α
2
1
(α1−b21δ1+b21n1δ1)
((2βγ + βα1 + βτ1 + γα1 + γτ1 + γ2)) (2βγ + βn1α1 + γn1α1 + γ2)
< 0.
In perfect competition, we have to change the demand functions (8) and (9) by setting λ1 = λ2 = 0. If
we derive the new equations determining the coeﬃcients, it turns out that the form of our measures of
mispricing does not change, only we have to calculate them with the new equilibrium b1, c1, e1, e2, b2, τ1
values. If δ1 → 0, τ1, f2 → 0, hence our measure goes to
α1
((1−µ)e2γ−βµb2)
e2
¡
2βγ + βn1α1 + γn1α1 + γ
2
¢
− γn1
¡
βα1 + γα1 + 2βγ + γ
2
¢
(2βγ + βn1α1 + γn1α1 + γ2) (βα1 + γα1 + 2βγ + γ2)
in the case of the private signal, and to
c1
e1
− (β(2γ+n1α1))
(2βγ+βn1α1+γn1α1+γ2)
=
26
=
(1−µ)β(2γ+α1)+µ 1e2 b2β(α1+γ)+µ
1
e2
2βγ+βα2+βτ2µ
ρ(2γ+α2+τ2)+ 1b2
n2
γτ2
n2−1
¶ (α1β+γα1+2γβ+γ2)


(2βγ+βα1+γα1+γ2)
− (β(2γ+n1α1))
(2βγ+βn1α1+γn1α1+γ2)
in the case of the public signal. Diﬀerentiating with respect to µ gives the last statements of the
proposition.
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Figures
Figure 1: Coeﬃcients of the private signal (solid) and the public signal (dashed) in the first period as
µ changes. (n1 = 3, n2 = 3, α1 = 2, α2 = 1, δ1 = 2, δ2 = 1, γ = 1)
Figure 2: Coeﬃcients of the private signal (solid), the public signal (dashed) and the first period price
(dotted) in the second period as µ changes. (n1 = 3, n2 = 3, α1 = 2, α2 = 1, δ1 = 2, δ2 = 1, γ = 1)
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Figure 3: Slope of the demand curve in the first period (solid) and in the second period (dashed) as
µ changes. (n1 = 3, n2 = 3, α1 = 2, α2 = 1, δ1 = 2, δ2 = 1, γ = 1)
Figure 4: Coeﬃcients of the private signal (solid) and the public signal (dashed) in the first period as
µ changes. (n1 = 3, n2 = 3, α1 = 2, α2 = 1, δ1 = 5, δ2 = 1, γ = 1)
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Figure 5: Coeﬃcients of the private signal (solid), the public signal (dashed) and the first period price
(dotted) in the second period as µ changes. (n1 = 3, n2 = 3, α1 = 2, α2 = 1, δ1 = 5, δ2 = 1, γ = 1)
Figure 6: Slope of the demand curve in the first period (solid) and in the second period (dashed) as
µ changes. (n1 = 3, n2 = 3, α1 = 2, α2 = 1, δ1 = 5, δ2 = 1, γ = 1)
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Figure 7: Information content in current prices in the first period (solid) and in the second period
(dashed) as µ changes. (n1 = 3, n2 = 3, α1 = 2, α2 = 1, δ1 = 2, δ2 = 1, γ = 1)
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Figure 8: Over- or underreaction of the private signal (crosses) and the public signal (asterisk) in the
first period in the 3.a case (n1 = 3, n2 = 3, α1 = 2, α2 = 1, δ1 = 1, δ2 = 1, γ = 1), and the δ1 → 0
case (circles — public, dotts— private) as µ changes. The imperfect and perfect competition cases are
indistinguisable.
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